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I.  Introduction 
Imagine finding yourself in litigation in a foreign country. Then, 
imagine learning that, in the past, your opponent has routinely hired the 
person who will be the “neutral” adjudicator in your case. Now imagine that 
since the commencement of the litigation your opponent subsequently has 
appointed the adjudicator to also be its party-appointed arbitrator in other 
pending disputes arising out of the same incident that has given rise to your 
dispute. And, imagine that neither the adjudicator nor your opponent 
discloses the adjudicator’s appointments in the other pending disputes. 
Would you feel like the adjudicator is going to treat your case fairly and 
impartially? 
Assuming the case does not involve a car accident caused by an 
American tourist in a third world country that is being adjudicated in a 
sham trial, do you think the judge would remove the “neutral” adjudicator if 
you were to challenge the adjudicator for potential bias in favor of your 
opponent? If you said “yes,” then you would be wrong in an English 
arbitration proceeding pursuant to a “Bermuda Form” insurance policy. 
This scenario is not a hypothetical situation. The material elements of 
this scenario currently are unfolding in English courts for Halliburton 
Company (Halliburton), a Fortune 100 company based in Houston with 
approximately 55,000 employees and operations in about 70 countries.1 
On April 20, 2010, when a deep-water oil well in the Gulf of Mexico 
was in the process of being plugged and temporarily abandoned, the well 
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suffered a blowout.2 There was an explosion and a fire on the Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig servicing the well.3 BP Exploration and Production Inc. 
(BP) was the lessee of the rig.4 Transocean Holdings LLC (Transocean) was 
the owner of the rig and had been engaged by BP to provide the crew and 
drilling teams.5 Halliburton provided cementing and well-monitoring 
services to BP in connection with the temporary abandonment of the well.6 
Numerous claims were asserted against BP, Transocean, and 
Halliburton by the U.S. Government, as well as corporate and individual 
claimants in connection with the explosion and massive oil spill that 
ensued.7 Many of the claims were consolidated into a single multidistrict 
litigation in federal court in the Eastern District of Louisiana.8 Shortly 
before a verdict was rendered in a trial regarding liability, Halliburton 
settled for approximately $1.1 billion.9 Ultimately, when judgment was 
rendered, Halliburton was only found 3% liable.10 
Halliburton has substantial insurance to cover its liabilities. The policy 
at issue in the English litigation is a Bermuda Form liability policy drafted 
and issued by Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd. (Chubb) (formerly known as 
ACE Limited) that provides $100 million of coverage.11 When 
Halliburton’s $100 million claim was tendered for payment, Chubb denied 
coverage, contending that Halliburton’s settlement was unreasonable and 
entered without Chubb’s consent.12 
Although the policy specified that New York law would govern the 
resolution of any disputes, the policy called for arbitration in London with 
three arbitrators—one appointed by each party and the third appointed by 
the two chosen arbitrators. If the two chosen arbitrators could not agree 
upon the third arbitrator, then the appointment was made by England’s 
High Court.13 The two chosen arbitrators could not, in fact, agree on the 
third arbitrator so the High Court appointed Arbitrator M, an arbitrator 
requested by Chubb, as the chair of the arbitration panel.14 
Chubb previously had appointed Arbitrator M as a party-appointed 
arbitrator in numerous matters, and he was currently an arbitrator in two 
 
2. Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Ins. Ltd. [2018] EWCA Civ. 817, [4] (Eng.). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at [5]. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at [7]. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at [8]. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at [6]. 
12. Id. at [9]. 
13. Id. at [6]. 
14. Id. at [10]. In order to maintain anonymity, the opinions refer to the arbitrator at issue as 
“M” instead of by name. 
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other pending arbitration proceedings in which Chubb was a party. Not 
surprisingly, Halliburton objected to Arbitrator M’s appointment as the 
“neutral” arbitrator.15 
While the arbitration between Halliburton and Chubb was pending, 
Arbitrator M accepted another appointment from Chubb as an arbitrator in a 
separate arbitration proceeding with Transocean regarding the same 
Deepwater Horizon incident.16 In that matter, Chubb contended, among 
other things, that Transocean’s settlement of the underlying claims was 
unreasonable and entered without Chubb’s consent.17 
In addition, Arbitrator M subsequently accepted another appointment 
as an arbitrator by another insurer during the pendency of the Halliburton 
arbitration in yet another insurance arbitration involving Chubb and the 
same Deepwater Horizon incident.18 Throughout this time, neither Chubb 
nor Arbitrator M disclosed to Halliburton that Arbitrator M had accepted 
insurer appointments as an arbitrator in the two other pending insurance 
disputes involving the same Deepwater Horizon incident.19 
When Halliburton learned of the other appointments, it requested that 
Arbitrator M recuse himself because there was a perception that he might 
not be impartial under the circumstances due to his failure to disclose his 
involvement as an insurer-appointed arbitrator in these other disputes 
involving Chubb and the same Deepwater Horizon incident. Arbitrator M 
declined to do so unless Chubb agreed that he should.20 Chubb did not agree 
that he should recuse himself, so Halliburton brought a lawsuit in the 
English courts to remove Arbitrator M as the chair of the arbitration panel.21 
On February 3, 2017, the High Court denied Halliburton’s request to 
remove Arbitrator M, stating: 
M is a well-known and highly respected international arbitrator. He 
has extensive experience of insurance and reinsurance law, both 
English and New York law. . . . He has sat as a member of an 
arbitration tribunal in over thirty references concerning the Bermuda 
Form over many years. He enjoys a reputation as an international 
arbitrator of the highest quality and integrity. 
. . . 
[Halliburton’s request] seems to proceed from the false premise that 
party appointed arbitrators cannot be expected to comply with their 
own duties of impartiality and need the chairman to ensure that they 
 
15. Id. at [10]–[19]. 
 16. Id. at [13]. 
 17. Id. at [9]. 
18. Id. at [15]. 
19. Id. at [13]–[15]. 
 20. See id. at [16]. 
21. Id. at [19]–[20]. 
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do not exercise bias in favour of their appointees, a proposition 
which is as offensive to the international arbitration community in 
general, and to [the party-appointed arbitrators] in particular, as it is 
erroneous.22 
Halliburton appealed the High Court’s ruling to England’s Court of 
Appeals.23 
On March 1, 2017, while Halliburton’s appeal regarding the removal 
of Arbitrator M was pending, the arbitration tribunals in the two other 
disputes involving the Deepwater Horizon incident in which Arbitrator M 
was an arbitrator entered judgment in favor of Chubb.24 
On December 5, 2017, while Halliburton’s appeal regarding the 
removal of Arbitrator M was still pending, the arbitration panel proceeded 
to enter judgment in favor of Chubb in the Halliburton arbitration by a 2–1 
vote with Arbitrator M and Chubb’s party-appointed arbitrator voting in 
favor of Chubb.25 Halliburton could not appeal the arbitration panel’s 
decision because the parties have no appellate rights under the Bermuda 
Form policy drafted and issued by Chubb.26 
On April 19, 2018, England’s Court of Appeals affirmed the High 
Court’s ruling in favor of Chubb with respect to the removal of Arbitrator 
M. The court reasoned that: 
[Although] M ought as a matter of good practice and, in the 
circumstances of this case, as a matter of law to have made 
disclosure to Halliburton at the time of his appointments in [the other 
related matters]. . . . M is a “well known and highly respected 
international arbitrator” with very extensive experience as an 
arbitrator. . . . [Thus,] we agree with the [High Court] judge’s overall 
conclusion that the fair-minded and informed observer, having 
considered the facts, would not conclude that there was a real 
possibility that M was biased.27 
In short, Chubb’s repeated party appointments of Arbitrator M and 
Arbitrator M’s failure to disclose subsequent party appointments by Chubb 
and another insurer in other pending arbitrations involving the same 
Deepwater Horizon incident would not give a “fair-minded and informed 
observer” reason to believe that there “was a real possibility that 
[Arbitrator] M was biased.”28 So, even though the Court of Appeals 
 
22. Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Ins. Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [9], [30] 
(Eng.). 
  23.  See Halliburton Co. [2018] EWCA Civ. 817. 
24. Id. at [23]. 
25. Id. at [24]. 
26. Halliburton Co. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [5(4)]. 
27. Halliburton Co. [2018] EWCA Civ. 817, [94], [98], [100] (quoting Justice Popplewell 
in Halliburton Co. [2017] EWHC 137 (Comm)). 
28. Id. at [100]. 
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concluded Arbitrator M should have disclosed the subsequent pending 
appointments in the other arbitrations in which Chubb was involved, if he 
had done so it would not have mattered. Halliburton still would not have 
had a valid basis to object to Arbitrator M’s continued participation as the 
“neutral” chair in Halliburton’s arbitration because Arbitrator M is a “well 
known and highly respected international arbitrator”—i.e., it was a 
remediless breach of duty by Arbitrator M.29 
Central to the Court of Appeals’ analysis is the premise that 
arbitrators, whether appointed by a party or otherwise, have: 
[a] duty to act independently and impartially . . . owing no allegiance 
to the party appointing them. Once appointed they are entirely 
independent of their appointing party and bound to conduct and 
decide the case fairly and impartially.30 
In addition, the Court of Appeals assumed that the mere fact that an 
arbitrator has accepted multiple appointments concerning the same or 
overlapping subject matter for the same party and apparently has reached 
results favorable enough to the party that the party repeatedly appoints him 
“does not of itself give rise to an appearance of bias. . . . ‘Something more 
is required’ and that must be ‘something of substance.’”31 That “something 
more” was lacking in the Halliburton matter, in the Court of Appeals’ 
opinion. 
The Court of Appeals was also not particularly troubled by the fact 
that Arbitrator M might have been exposed to information and evidence in 
Chubb’s other arbitration proceeding regarding the Deepwater Horizon 
incident that could shape Arbitrator M’s view of Halliburton’s claim 
without Halliburton being aware what that the evidence was or even given a 
chance to respond to it.32 Although the Court of Appeals recognized this 
was a “legitimate concern,” the court dismissed it, stating: 
Arbitrators are assumed to be trustworthy and to understand that they 
should approach every case with an open mind. The mere fact of 
appointment and decision making in overlapping references does not 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality. 
Objectively this is not affected by the fact that there is a common 
party. An arbitrator may be trusted to decide a case solely on the 
evidence or other material before him in the reference in question 
and that is equally so where there is a common party.33 
 
 
29. Id. at [98] (quoting Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. State of Brunei Darussalam (No 3), [2007] 
UKPC 62, [2008] 2LRC 196 at [18]). 
30. Id. at [26] (quoting the Halliburton Co. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [19]). 
31. Id. at [53] (quoting Dyson LJ in AMEC Capital Projects Ltd. v. Whitefriars City Estates 
Ltd. [2005] 1 All ER 723, [20]). 
32. Id. at [49]–[50]. 
33. Id. at [51].  
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Halliburton has petitioned England’s Supreme Court to allow an 
appeal. The Supreme Court has an opportunity to review the lower courts’ 
analysis and conclusion, but it remains to be seen whether the Supreme 
Court will hear the case or what its decision will be if it does. 
In the meantime, the case presents the questions of whether: 1) English 
arbitrations under Bermuda Form policies provide a venue and dispute 
resolution process in which American policyholders can feel confident that 
justice will be served, and 2) England’s lower courts’ analysis and 
conclusion would be affirmed under U.S. law. As things stand now, the 
answer to both questions is “no.” 
II.  Bermuda Form Policies and London Arbitrations in Contrast to 
Judicial Proceedings in the United States 
The Bermuda Form is an excess liability policy form that was created 
by ACE Insurance Company Limited (ACE) in 1985.34 ACE was a 
Bermuda-based insurance company that was created by Marsh & 
McLennan, an insurance broker, and J.P. Morgan, a bank, in response to the 
liability insurance crisis in the mid-1980s when the market for excess 
liability insurance became very challenging due, among other reasons, to 
the explosion of long-tail claims related to asbestos and environmental 
contamination. Although it originally was sold just by ACE and XL 
Insurance Limited (XL), another Bermuda-based insurance company, the 
Bermuda Form is now sold by other insurers as well, and it is commonly 
sold to corporate policyholders in the United States.35 
The Bermuda Form was created by insurers to address their 
dissatisfaction with U.S. courts’ interpretation of policy provisions 
commonly found in existing liability policies. Specifically, insurers 
perceived that the courts in many states were pro-policyholder. To address 
that concern, New York law is specified as the controlling law under 
Bermuda Form policies, and disputes are resolved in binding arbitration in 
London (or less commonly, Bermuda).36 New York law is generally 
perceived as the most favorable for insurers in the United States. 
Nonetheless, the Bermuda Form also modifies New York law in the areas 
where insurers view New York law as unfavorable to insurers, such as New 
York’s rules regarding the interpretation of insurance policies. In addition, 
there are no appellate rights regarding the arbitrators’ decisions under 
Bermuda Form policies in order to ensure that U.S. courts will not have any 
involvement in the resolution of the parties’ disputes.37 
 
34. In 2016, ACE acquired Chubb, but ACE adopted Chubb’s name, so the surviving 
company is named Chubb. 
35. See RICHARD JACOBS, LORELIE S. MASTERS, & PAUL STANLEY, LIABILITY INSURANCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE BERMUDA FORM 1, 10–12 (2d ed. 2011).  
 36. Id. at 127. 
37. Id. at 6. 
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Under the Bermuda Form, the arbitration is comprised of a three-
arbitrator panel with each party picking one of the arbitrators and the two 
chosen arbitrators selecting the third arbitrator, who acts as the “neutral” 
chair of the panel.38 Insurers typically select an English barrister or a retired 
English judge as their party-appointed arbitrator so they will not be 
influenced by the U.S. courts’ perceived bias in favor of policyholders.39 It 
is not uncommon for both the insurer’s party-appointed arbitrator and the 
“neutral” arbitrator to work in the same chambers because English barristers 
are viewed as independent contractors even though they may work in the 
same office.40 
An English arbitration proceeding is an unfamiliar and exotic legal 
process for most American companies. For example, although parties 
exchange documents, written discovery such as interrogatories and requests 
for admission is not conducted.41 Depositions are also not conducted, so the 
first opportunity counsel has to question the opposing party’s witnesses is in 
the arbitration proceeding itself.42 In addition, there are no live direct 
examinations of witnesses.43 Direct examinations of witnesses are 
“conducted” by way of written statements that are drafted by the attorneys, 
solicitors, and/or barristers and then submitted to the arbitrators. The only 
live examination of witnesses is on cross examination.44 
English arbitrations differ from U.S. court litigation in a number of 
other important aspects as well. One, arbitrators are chosen and paid by the 
parties.45 Although English law provides that arbitrators should be 
independent and impartial once appointed, if an arbitrator’s livelihood is 
dependent upon receiving appointments and obtaining results satisfactory to 
the party appointing the arbitrator, then it is a legal fiction to pretend that 
party-appointed arbitrators are independent and neutral. Stated differently, 
how likely is it that Chubb and other insurers would continue to appoint 
Arbitrator M decade after decade if the results they were receiving in the 
arbitrations with him were unfavorable? Indeed, why have party-appointed 
arbitrators at all if they are truly independent and neutral? Why not simply 
 
 38. Id. at 591. 
 39. Id. at 273–74. 
40. Id. at 279–80. 
 41. See id. at 310 (outlining the standard requirement for disclosure, which does not include 
requests for admission); id. at 331 (stating powers available in English litigation, such as 
discovery by interrogatory, are restricted in the arbitration setting); id. at 335 (noting that 
arbitrators’ power to order “questions [to] be put to and answered by the respective parties” is 
most commonly used for merely clarifying a party’s case, not to elicit information for use at the 
hearing) (internal quotations omitted).  
 42. Id. at 284.  
 43. Id. at 285. 
44. Id. at 284.  
 45. Arbitration Act 1996 c. 23, §§ 16, 28 (Eng.). 
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have an arbitration organization, as opposed to the parties, appoint one or 
more arbitrators if they are all neutral? 
Two, English arbitrations are subject to very limited judicial control 
and review. Although regular English arbitrations allow for judicial review 
of rulings regarding English law, there are no appellate rights under 
Bermuda Form policies, including the policy at issue in the Halliburton 
case, with respect to the arbitrators’ decision.46 In a court proceeding, in 
contrast, there are numerous checks and balances on the decision makers. 
First, the parties are entitled to a jury trial with the jury comprised of people 
who do not know the parties.47 Second, if a party is dissatisfied with the 
jury’s verdict, then the party can ask the trial court to set aside the verdict or 
grant a new trial.48 Third, the party can appeal both the trial court’s legal 
rulings and the jury’s verdict.49 
Three, English arbitration proceedings and the results thereof are 
confidential. Thus, a repeat player in English arbitrations, such as Chubb, is 
aware of the results obtained in past arbitrations including, for example, 
which arbitrators ruled in its favor. Non-repeat players in arbitrations, such 
as the typical American policyholder, do not know the results of the past 
arbitrations. This creates a significant information asymmetry between 
insurers and policyholders. Court proceedings, in contrast, are public. Thus, 
both parties have equal access to judicial opinions and they are able to 
research the proclivities and ideologies of the judges before whom they 
appear. 
Four, the standard for what constitutes potential bias or the potential 
for the appearance of bias that would justify recusal appears to be quite 
different in an English arbitration than in a typical U.S. court proceeding if 
the High Court’s and Court of Appeals’ rulings are reflective of English law 
and practice. As an initial matter, judges in the U.S. are not selected by the 
parties to resolve their disputes so the judges’ livelihoods do no depend 
upon the results they procure for the party appointing them.50 If a judge 
were financially dependent upon one of the parties in a case, then it would 
be unquestioned in the U.S. that the judge would need to recuse himself. 
Indeed, if a judge has any involvement with any party, then the judge 
should recuse himself.51 Similarly, if a juror even knows one of the parties 
or attorneys in the case, then that juror typically is dismissed. 
 
46. See Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [5] 
(Eng.). 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 38; see FED. R. CIV. P. 47 (allowing parties to examine potential jurors 
and excuse party-selected jurors for cause).  
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
49. Id.   
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2016). 
51. See id. § 455 (listing various reasons a judge should recuse himself). 
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Under English law, an arbitrator is only removed if “circumstances 
exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality . . . .”52 The test 
under that language is “whether [a] fair-minded and informed observer, 
having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility 
that the tribunal was biased.”53 It is an objective test. On its face, this test 
does not seem very different than U.S. law, and one would expect 
Arbitrator M to be disqualified because he repeatedly has been appointed by 
Chubb and he accepted appointments by Chubb and another insurer related 
to the same underlying matter without disclosing them. Yet, repeated party 
appointments by the same party, even in the same type of case, in itself 
does not provide a basis for a reasonable apprehension of lack of 
impartiality according to England’s Court of Appeals.54 “Something more is 
required,” and it must be “something of substance.”55 It is unclear what 
exactly the “something more” of “substance” must be if a history of 
numerous appointments by the same party in disputes involving the same 
policy language in exchange for money and then failing to disclose 
contemporaneous appointments by an opposing party in connection with the 
same underlying incident are not enough. 
Finally, English arbitrations are as, if not more, expensive as litigating 
in U.S. courts. In an English arbitration, the parties have to hire English 
solicitors and barristers, as well as the three arbitrators, which means the 
arbitration process is top heavy with English solicitors and barristers who 
charge much higher rates than most U.S. attorneys. And, most American 
policyholders typically also have U.S. attorneys working on the matters as 
well. Then, the parties, witnesses, counsel, and arbitrators must travel to 
and house themselves in London, one of the most expensive cities in the 
world, for the duration of the arbitration proceeding. It is a very expensive 
way to resolve disputes. 
III. Why American Companies Historically Have Purchased Bermuda 
Form Policies 
Regardless of what England’s Supreme Court decides, why would an 
American policyholder who wants a fair process in which to resolve 
insurance coverage disputes buy a Bermuda Form policy to cover losses 
that can total hundreds of millions of dollars and potentially bankrupt the 
policyholder if the dispute resolution process under Bermuda Form policies 
is decidedly slanted in favor of the insurer? There may be one or more 
answers to that question depending upon the particular policyholder. 
 
52. Arbitration Act 1996 c. 23, § 24(1)(a) (Eng.). 
53. Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Ins. Ltd. [2018] EWCA Civ. 817, [39] (Eng.). 
54. Id. at [81]–[82] (noting it would be “absurd” if the remuneration a party-appointed 
arbitrator receives for an appointment would be a basis for disqualification). 
55. Id. at [53]. 
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One, there are some aspects of the Bermuda Form policy language that 
actually favor policyholders. For example, the Bermuda Form expressly 
covers claims for punitive damages.56 Few liability policies in the U.S. 
expressly cover punitive damages, and many U.S. state courts have 
concluded liability policies should not even be allowed to cover such claims 
for public policy reasons.57 
Two, ACE and XL, the primary sellers of Bermuda Form policies for 
many years, were well-capitalized companies.58 Consequently, 
policyholders could be confident that, if necessary, their insurers had the 
financial resources to pay claims totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Three, many policyholders likely were not even cognizant of the one-
sided nature of the dispute resolution provisions of Bermuda Form policies 
because they had not read the policies. Indeed, most policyholders do not 
receive copies of insurance policies before they purchase them, and even if 
they have copies of the policies, they have not read them or understood 
them.59 
Four, for many years the premium price and lack of alternatives made 
Bermuda Form policies an attractive option. The Bermuda Form was first 
created and sold when the liability insurance market was in crisis, and there 
were skyrocketing premium prices for traditional excess liability insurance 
with only limited availability.60 Bermuda Form policies were the best, if not 
only, option for some policyholders. 
Finally, policyholders historically could count on the appointment of 
independent, neutral arbitrators in English arbitrations. If that were not the 
case, then there would be a lengthy list of cases like Halliburton’s in which 
the policyholder was challenging the appointment of the neutral arbitrator 
in English courts. There is not. Prior to the Halliburton case, American 
policyholders generally could expect that an unbiased person would be 
appointed as the neutral arbitrator. If that is no longer the case, then it is 
 
56. See JACOBS, MASTER, & STANLEY, supra note 35, at 44. 
57. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 433, 441–43 (5th Cir. 
1962) (explaining that the policy did not expressly cover or exclude coverage for punitive 
damages and holding that it was against public policy for insurance to cover punitive damages 
because allowing coverage would undermine the deterrent and punishing effects of a punitive 
damages award); CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH & ROBERT H. JERRY II, INSURANCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE: CASES, MATERIALS, & EXERCISES 878 (2018) (“Courts are split on the question of 
whether public policy allows punitive damages to be insured as a matter of public policy.”). 
58. See, e.g., ACE, ACE LIMITED’S 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2014) (reporting the annual 
income for 2014 was $3.3 billion), http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/ 
AnnualReportArchive/c/NYSE_CB_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCV7-A4ZM]. 
59. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
653, 660 (2013); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1120 (2006); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at 
Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970).   
60. See JACOBS, MASTERS, & STANLEY, supra note 35, at 1, 10. 
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unlikely that any of the first four reasons discussed in this Part of the Essay 
would continue to justify the purchase of Bermuda Form policies. 
IV. Viewing the English Courts’ Decisions through the Prism of the 
United States Legal System 
It is hard to predict what England’s Supreme Court will do in the 
Halliburton case, but it is not hard to predict the outcome of the case under 
U.S. law. For numerous reasons, the lower courts’ rulings would be 
reversed, and Arbitrator M would be disqualified and removed. 
First, although arbitrators, including party-appointed arbitrators, are 
supposed to be independent and impartial under English law, it defies 
reality or logic to believe that an arbitrator who is repeatedly appointed by a 
party in exchange for money is impartial with respect to that party. Indeed, 
if the results that Chubb received in past arbitrations in which Arbitrator M 
was appointed were unfavorable, then Chubb would not repeatedly appoint 
Arbitrator M. That fact alone should be enough to raise a reasonable and 
justified appearance of impartiality by Arbitrator M. 
Second, even if Arbitrator M is not consciously biased in favor of 
Chubb despite repeated appointments by Chubb, there is, at a minimum, an 
appearance of subconscious bias by Arbitrator M in favor of Chubb.61 If 
Arbitrator M does not have at least a subconscious bias in favor of Chubb, 
then is it just a coincidence that Arbitrator M consistently reaches decisions 
that favor of Chubb, including all three of the Deepwater Horizon 
arbitrations that recently were concluded? 
Third, contrary to the High Court’s and the Court of Appeals’ 
observations, whether Arbitrator M is a well-respected international 
arbitrator is irrelevant in the case. What is relevant is whether it appears 
that Arbitrator M lacks impartiality with respect to Chubb’s and 
Halliburton’s positions. For the reasons discussed above, there certainly is a 
reasonable basis to conclude that there is an appearance of bias by 
Arbitrator M regardless of whether that appearance reflects reality. The 
appearance of impartiality is the foundation of a legitimate and fair dispute 
resolution proceeding. Without the appearance of impartiality by the 
decision maker, then the dispute resolution proceeding and result therein 
will not be viewed as legitimate. 
Finally, although the other Deepwater Horizon arbitrations purportedly 
were going to be decided based upon different legal issues, Chubb denied 
coverage to its other policyholder, Transocean, in one of those arbitrations 
on some of the same grounds that it did in the Halliburton matter—the 
settlements allegedly were unreasonable and entered without Chubb’s 
 
61. Some of the earliest work in the area of unconscious bias can be traced to Anthony 
Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji. See generally Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit 
Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995). 
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consent.62 Consequently, it is irrefutable that some, if not many, of the facts 
and legal issues in the various matters potentially were the same. Because 
Bermuda Form English arbitration proceedings are confidential, however, 
Halliburton would have no way of knowing what evidence was presented in 
the other arbitration proceedings that might have impacted Arbitrator M’s 
decision making with respect to Halliburton’s claim, and Halliburton had no 
opportunity or ability to respond to that evidence. That is not fair and would 
not be countenanced by U.S. courts. 
V. Conclusion 
England’s Supreme Court has an opportunity to correct the lower 
courts’ errors when they allowed Arbitrator M to be the neutral chair in the 
Halliburton arbitration proceeding. Neutral arbitrators should not 
simultaneously be party-appointed arbitrators in other proceedings that 
involve some of the same parties and the same underlying matter. For the 
past thirty years, American policyholders have been able to count on 
English arbitrations to have a neutral and fair tribunal chair. If that will no 
longer be the case, then there are several other cities, such as Singapore, 
Zurich, Paris, or Toronto, that undoubtedly would be pleased to replace 
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